36.1 RUSSIAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2019 1:50 PM

PROTECTING PASSENGER FEES:
REAWAKENING CONGRESS’S
TONNAGE CLAUSE
AUTHORIZATION POWERS
Bradley Russian*
ABSTRACT
For 20 years, the City of Juneau has collected passenger fees from cruise lines
that enter its port. These fees are assessed based on the number of passengers
that arrive on each cruise vessel, and amount to $8.00 per passenger. On
December 6, 2018, in Cruise Lines International Association Alaska v.
The City and Borough of Juneau, the U.S. District Court of Alaska held that
Juneau’s use of the passenger fees violates the U.S. Constitution’s Tonnage
Clause. Rather than appeal the decision, the City of Juneau subsequently settled
the litigation with the cruise lines. This Note will examine Juneau’s passenger
fees in light of the Tonnage Clause. It will argue that because Juneau and the
State of Alaska depend on these fees and other tourism revenue, Alaska
policymakers should lobby Congress to use its Tonnage Clause authorizing
powers to grant Alaska port cities the authority to charge set passenger fees to
visiting cruise lines. Part One will analyze the Court’s historical
understanding of the Tonnage Clause. Part Two will examine the litigation,
the court’s decision in Cruise Lines International, and the recent settlement
between the City and the cruise lines. Part Three will consider how this case
may disrupt Alaska’s tourism industry and economy and will focus on other
Alaska laws that may be invalidated on the basis of this decision. Part Four will
propose a model law for passage by Congress, to help Alaska work around the
holding in Cruise Lines International.
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Just off the boat, cruise line tourists visiting Juneau may explore the
city’s downtown shops, restaurants, and other local amenities. They may
meander down Franklin Street and head to the nearby waterfront
Seawalk bordering the scenic harbor.1 Seasonal crossing guards usher
more than 1,000,000 visitors along this journey during peak tourist
season—from May to September.2 At the far end of the Seawalk, visitors
are greeted by vast mountains; the harbor water curves through these
mountains and extends beyond view. On the journey back into town, the
Seawalk culminates at the base of a life-size, bronze statue of a humpback
whale.3 A fountain and an array of lights decorate the whale—the
brainchild of former Juneau mayors Bill Overstreet and Bruce Botelho.4
According to Cruise Lines International Association Alaska
(CLIAA), the trade association that represents cruise lines operating in
Alaska, much of this downtown infrastructure has been funded
inappropriately.5 The Seawalk and seasonal crossing guards, along with
the recent upgrades to Franklin Street, Front Street, and the downtown
area, are all on a long list of items that CLIAA believes have been financed
illicitly through a misappropriation of funds collected from cruise
passengers.6 The passenger fees that Juneau charges the cruise lines
amount to $8.00 per passenger entering the port and total more than

1. CITY/BOROUGH OF JUNEAU ALASKA’S CAPITAL CITY, ENG’G DEP’T, MARINE
PARK/SEAWALK PROJECT, http://www.juneau.org/engineering/Marine_Park/
MarinePark.php (describing the marine sea walk project) (last visited Feb. 23,
2019).
2. MCDOWELL GROUP, ALASKA VISITORS STATISTIC PROGRAM 7 − SUMMER 2016:
SECTION 12 – SUMMARY OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMUNITY, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12-1 (2016), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/
Portals/6/pub/TourismResearch/AVSP/2016/12.%20AVSP%207%20Summ%2
0Profiles%20Southeast.pdf?ver=2017-06-06-133940-030. Of more than 1,200,000
visitors to the Alaska Southeast region, over ninety percent of people visiting
Juneau, Ketchikan, Skagway, Glacier Bay, and Hoonah were cruise tourists. Id. at
1−2.
3. Gregory Philson, Whale Worth the Wait: Lights, Fountain Complete Full-size
Bronze Whale Statue Downtown, JUNEAU EMPIRE (May 16, 2018),
https://www.juneauempire.com/news/whale-worth-the-wait-lights-fountaincomplete-full-size-bronze-whale-statue-downtown/.
4. Id.
5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2−3, Cruise Lines Int’l
Ass’n Alaska v. City & Borough of Juneau, Alaska, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH (D.
Alaska Apr. 13, 2016) (No. 1).
6. See id. (noting that CLIAA alleges that the proceeds generated from entry
fees were misappropriated); see also Sam DeGrave, Lawsuit Looms Heavier over
Chamber Luncheon, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.juneau
empire.com/news/lawsuit-looms-heavy-over-chamber-luncheon/ (describing
CLIAA President John Brinkley’s announcement of the litigation against Juneau).
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$8,000,000 every year.7 CLIAA believes that under the U.S. Constitution,8
these funds must be used on projects more directly related to the cruise
lines’ well-being.9 In 2016, CLIAA sued to enjoin the City from further
collecting and misusing the passenger fees.10 CLIAA pointed to the large
bronze whale as a symbol of the City’s excess.11
On December 6, 2018, in Cruise Lines International Association Alaska
v. The City and Borough of Juneau,12 the U.S. District Court of Alaska
announced its opinion that Juneau’s use of the passenger fees violates the
U.S. Constitution’s Tonnage Clause.13 The Tonnage Clause says that “No
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage.”14
Traditionally, the Tonnage Clause has been interpreted to apply broadly
to any duty on a ship charged “for the privilege of entering, lying in, or
trading in a port.”15 Because the passenger fees here were levied upon the
ships and assessed on a per-passenger basis, they fell within the purview
of the clause.16 Moreover, the court rejected Juneau’s argument that the
passenger fees were exempted from the Tonnage Clause as a “service
fee,” one of the narrow classes of taxes, charges, and fees that are deemed
permissible under this body of jurisprudence.17 The court ruled that
Juneau may continue to collect passenger fees from visiting cruise ships,

7. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 5, at 5−8. This
fee is comprised of a $5.00 Marine Passenger Fee and a $3.00 Port Development
Fee, both of which are contested by CLIAA. Id. These fees are assessed to each of
the 1,000,000 cruise line tourists who visit the city. See id.
8. See generally id. CLIAA’s complaint raises questions of law under the U.S.
Constitution’s Tonnage Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Rivers and
Harbors Act. See id. at 8−12 (describing each cause of action).
9. Id. at 9.
10. See generally id.
11. See CLIA Alaska Files Suit Over $10 Million Whale Sculpture and Artificial
Island (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.cliaalaska.org/2016/04/clia-alaskachallenges-juneau-passenger-entry-fee-cites-10-million-artificial-island-projectas-unconstitutional/ (advertising on the CLIAA website that the industry is
litigating the issue over the whale and artificial island).
12. No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210665 (D. Alaska Dec. 6,
2018) [hereinafter Cruise Lines International].
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. As will be discussed infra Part I, a duty of
tonnage was historically recognized as any tax that was levied against a vessel for
the privilege of entering port.
15. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009). In this case, the
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance in the City of Valdez that charged
oil tankers a fee for using the city’s ports. Id. at 16. Interestingly, Polar Tankers was
the first Tonnage Clause case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court since 1935. Erik M.
Jensen, Quirky Constitutional Provisions Matter: The Tonnage Clause, Polar Tankers,
and State Taxation of Commerce, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670 (2011).
16. Cruise Lines International, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210665, at *11.
17. Id. at *14−16.
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but that it would be strictly limited in how it spends those fees.18 Juneau
would only be able to spend passenger fees on projects that directly
benefit the cruise vessels themselves.19 Although the City contemplated
appealing this decision, Juneau and CLIAA ultimately announced a
settlement to this lawsuit.20 The settlement allows Juneau to continue
collecting and spending passenger fees, but requires them to consult with
CLIAA before raising the fees or spending them on new projects in the
future.21
This Note argues that although Juneau and CLIAA settled their
dispute here, the Alaska District Court’s holding in Cruise Lines
International may still be harmful to the Alaska tourism industry, and
unfair to Alaska citizens. The case narrowed the kinds of charges that are
permissible as “service fees” in a way that stands to invalidate passenger
fees in other Alaska cities.22 Juneau’s passenger fees closely mirror a
statewide head tax charged to cruise lines by the Alaska state
government, as well as other comparable fees assessed by similarly
situated Alaska port cities.23 Though the cruise line industry may be
hesitant to litigate against these laws in the immediate wake of this
decision, they ultimately may use the district court’s holding as precedent
to mount a new attack against other laws of this kind in Alaska.24 Many
18. Id. at *46.
19. Id.
20. See Juneau Assembly Accepts Settlement Agreement with Cruise Industry,
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.alaskapublic.org/
2019/03/25/juneau-assembly-accepts-settlement-agreement-with-cruiseindustry/ (describing the Juneau Assembly’s vote to end the three-year legal
battle with CLIAA); see also 2019 CLIA v. CBJ Settlement Agreement,
https://packet.cbjak.org/CoverSheet.aspx?ItemID=6766&MeetingID=1087 (last
visited May 1, 2019) [hereinafter Juneau Settlement].
21. See Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 7 (“the Parties shall endeavor to
meet in person to discuss in good-faith any new proposed projects and services
for which Fees are sought to be expended in the following Fiscal Year with the
ultimate decision resting with the Assembly.”).
22. See Jacob Resneck, Cruise Industry’s Juneau Lawsuit Could Set Wider
Precedent, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/2017/
11/01/cruise-industrys-juneau-lawsuit-set-wider-precedent/ (discussing the
other Alaska city and state laws that may be susceptible to attacks as violations of
the Tonnage Clause).
23. Ten years ago, CLIAA’s predecessor organization—the Alaska Cruise
Association—challenged the state’s Commercial Passenger Vehicle excise tax as a
violation of the Tonnage Clause, but dropped the litigation when the state agreed
to lower the tax. See Paul Motter, Breaking Down the Alaska Head Tax,
CRUISEMATES, http://cwww.cruisemates.com/articles/feature/AlaskaCruise-Tax-072310.cfm (last visited May 1, 2019).
24. Resneck, supra note 22. Indeed, many state officials believed that this was
CLIAA’s intention from the outset. See, e.g., id. Former Juneau City Attorney Amy
Mead said, “If it were just a Juneau case, their motion would be tied to very
specific expenditures and this case would all be about very specific
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Alaska cities may become economically imperiled if these laws are struck
down; this would be an inequitable outcome in light of the historical
relationship between the parties.25
This Note seeks to identify a way for Juneau and Alaska
policymakers to secure long-term protections for the Alaska tourism
industry against this disruptive Tonnage Clause jurisprudence.
Specifically, it argues that Juneau and Alaska should appeal to the U.S.
Congress for recourse. The Tonnage Clause expressly endows Congress
with the ability to grant cities and states with the right to charge duties of
Tonnage.26 Congress has not addressed whether Juneau or Alaska may
collect passenger fees,27 but its intervention here could ensure that each
parties’ best interests are protected. On the one hand, it would benefit
Alaska by ensuring that its cities do not lose much-needed revenue from
tourism fees.28 At the same time, Congress could set the fee with a
standard formula that would protect the cruise lines against sudden or
unexpected increases in the passenger fees.29 Finally, congressional action
here would act as a back-stop to the Juneau-CLIAA settlement agreement,
ensuring good faith by the parties, and protection against third-party
intervention. The main obstacle in pursuing this path would be to get
Congress to act in an area where it has little experience,30 nor an overt
motive to legislate.31 However, if Congress could be persuaded to
legislate in this domain, it could provide a lasting protection for Alaska
tourism.32
This Note will examine Juneau’s passenger fees in light of the
Tonnage Clause. It will argue that because Alaska developed a
dependence on these fees and other tourism revenue based on
representations made by the cruise industry, Congress should grant
expenditures . . . [t]hat is not how CLIA has fashioned this lawsuit. They challenge
the constitutionality of the fees.” Id.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (noting that under the Tonnage Clause,
states may pass duties of tonnage with the approval of Congress).
27. Neither party has suggested that Congress granted its consent in their
briefs, and the author could find no evidence of such consent in the U.S. Code.
The only clear instance where Congress used its Tonnage Clause authorization
powers occured over 200 years ago when the legislature expressly authorized
South Carolina to collect duties of Tonnage. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672.
28. See infra Part III.
29. Although the Juneau-CLIAA settlement agreement seems to commit
Juneau to consult with CLIAA before raising passenger fees in the future, it leaves
ultimate decision-making authority with the city. See Juneau Settlement, supra
note 20, at 7. Moreover, the cruise-industry relies on its settlement agreement with
the state to prevent the CPV tax from raising. See ACA Settlement, infra note 160.
30. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672 n.17.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See id.

36.1 RUSSIAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

82

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/20/2019 1:50 PM

Vol. 36:1

Alaska port cities the unique authority to charge passenger fees to visiting
cruise lines, at a set rate. Part One will analyze the Court’s historical
understanding of the scope of the Tonnage Clause. Part Two will examine
the Cruise Lines International litigation and the court’s decision in that case.
It will briefly examine the announced settlement agreement between
Juneau and CLIAA. Part Three will discuss the Alaska tourism industry
and will consider how this case may disrupt that industry and the Alaska
economy. It will focus on other Alaska laws that may be invalidated on
the basis of this decision. Part Four will propose a model law for passage
by Congress that could help Alaska work around the holding in Cruise
Lines International. It argues that policymakers in Alaska should be
prepared to lobby Congress to pass legislation to protect revenues
secured from cruise line tourism. Part Five provides brief concluding
remarks.

I. THE TONNAGE CLAUSE
There is a long history of Tonnage Clause jurisprudence in the
United States.33 Originally designed as a limit on state economic power,34
the Tonnage Clause has been interpreted to bar a wide variety of taxes
and fees levied against vessels entering state ports.35 Equally numerous,
however, are the fees that ports charge to maritime vessels which do not
implicate the Tonnage Clause. These non-violate charges include
property taxes and service fees.36 The CLIAA litigation focused on
whether passenger fees fell within one of those separate classes of
charges, or whether Juneau was using the fees in a way that violated the
spirit of the Founders’ Tonnage Clause prohibition.37 This Section will
examine the underlying purposes of the Tonnage Clause, as well as the
scope of the clause’s prohibitions.

33. See generally Jensen, supra note 15 (describing the origins and history of
the Tonnage Clause).
34. See, e.g., Angelo J. Suozzi, The Misinterpretation of the Tonnage Clause in
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 290−92 (2009) (the
Framers recognized “that certain states with access to shipping lanes or natural
resources would be able to leverage their superior situation to the detriment of
their neighbors. To that end, the Constitution that arose from the Philadelphia
Convention contained provisions to facilitate trade among the states. Among
these provisions was the Tonnage Clause.”).
35. Id.
36. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 698−706 (discussing several classes of fees that
are not considered duties of tonnage under the Tonnage Clause).
37. See Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 210665, at *14−16 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018) (discussing whether the
passenger fees qualified as a service fee).
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A. A Restraint on Interstate Competition
The U.S. Constitution was designed to establish a strong central
government that could withstand the growing tensions and interstate
rivalries that had begun to develop under the Articles of Confederation.38
The Framers recognized that if each state was left to its own devices,
conflict would arise.39 They were particularly concerned that if the states
were given strong economic power, they would wield that power against
one another.40 Thus, the Constitution, by design, promotes a strong
central government with the authority to regulate the economy41 and
commerce among the states.42 It also limits states’ control over economic
matters.43 The Tonnage Clause is one such limitation.44
The Framer’s designed the Tonnage Clause to prohibit individual
states from levying taxes, without Congress’ approval, against vessels
“for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.”45 Notably,
the Tonnage Clause does not restrict the federal government from issuing
tonnage fees of its own.46 Rather, it prevents the states from taxing one
38. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53 (1988) (arguing that “interstate rivalry was the
[Constitutional] Convention’s greatest concern”).
39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that without the
Constitution, “[e]ach State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of
commercial policy peculiar to itself.”). See also JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK:
THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 274 (2003) (addressing rumors,
at the time, that America “would go the way of Europe, and ultimately three or
four, or more, confederacies would spring up”).
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts . . . To coin Money,
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures.”).
42. See id. (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
43. See id. art. I, § 10 (limiting states’ economic powers through the
prohibition that “No State shall . . . Coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts” or “pass any . . .
law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”).
44. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 688−98 (arguing that the Tonnage Clause
reinforces the Import-Export Clause and is part of a doctrine that gives primacy
to the federal government via the Dormant Commerce Clause).
45. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261,
265–66 (1935).
46. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 674 (noting that a federal duty of tonnage
must only satisfy constitutional rules that apply to the national taxing power, an
easy set of requirements for this sort of levy); see also State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 216 (1870) (suggesting that federal Tonnage Duties “have been
imposed by Congress ever since the Federal government was organized under the
Constitution”); 46 U.S.C. §§ 60301–12 (2008) (codifying duties of tonnage on
foreign vessels that enter U.S. ports).
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another competitively, as they had been able to do under the Articles of
Confederation.47 If states wanted to institute a tax or fee against vessels
visiting their ports, they would need congressional approval.48
B. What Counts as Tonnage?
The word tonnage is defined as the size or carrying capacity of a ship
measured in tons.49 Plainly applied, the clause would only prohibit states
from instituting taxes that charge a vessel based on its shipping capacity.50
However, if the Tonnage Clause only proscribed levies explicitly
measured by a vessel’s capacity, it would be easy for states to circumvent
the prohibition, so long as they could find a surrogate metric.51 Thus,
courts have understood “tonnage” to have a more expansive meaning,
encompassing taxes that operate as a charge for the privilege of entering
a port, regardless of whether that tax is based on a vessel’s tonnage per
se.52
While there is no bright-line rule for applying the Tonnage Clause,53
case law over the centuries has indicated what the rule prohibits. The
plain meaning of tonnage holds force under the clause; though not per se
illegal, state charges that are measured by “tonnage” are often regarded
47. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 690 (noting that states were able to engage in
“competitions of commerce” under the Articles of Confederation).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage.”) (emphasis added).
49. Tons were not a measure of weight. Rather, they were a measure of a
ship’s cubic carrying capacity. See State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at
212 (“The word tonnage, as applied to American ships and vessels, means their
entire cubical capacity, or the contents of the vessel expressed in tons of 100 cubic
feet, as estimated and ascertained by the rules of admeasurement and
computation prescribed by those Federal statutes.”); see also Jensen, supra note 15,
at 682 (arguing that if the Tonnage Clause actually prohibited something other
than levies on ships carrying goods, it would be largely redundant with the
Import-Export Clause which has broadly interpreted prohibitions).
50. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 684.
51. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 458 (1849) (Grier, J., concurring)
(arguing that if the Tonnage Clause only applied to the size of a vessel, it would
be possible for states to tax a vessel “indirectly which she is forbidden by the
[Tonnage Clause ] to do directly,” and thus, that a state must be forbidden from
“effecting the same purpose by merely changing the ratio, and graduating it on
the number of masts, or of mariners, the size and power of the steam-engine, or
the number of passengers which she carries.”).
52. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87 (3d ed. 1898) (arguing that states are not
“competent to levy dues upon vessels measured by their capacity, nor indeed any
dues at all which are imposed upon the vessels as instruments of commerce, or
are levied for the mere privilege of trading to a port”).
53. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 703 (arguing that one cannot make bright-line
distinctions in this area).
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with increased scrutiny under the Tonnage Clause.54 By contrast, other
taxes have been struck down even though they have been disguised. For
example, the Supreme Court voided a tax that charged vessels a single,
set fee, rather than a graduated tax based on the vessels’ carrying capacity
in a seeming attempt to circumvent Tonnage Clause restrictions.55
C. The Limits of the Tonnage Clause
To understand the scope of the Tonnage Clause, it is helpful to know
what kinds of taxes and fees a port may charge incoming vessels without
implicating the clause. Property taxes are one example of a charge
assessed to vessels entering port which are not considered duties of
tonnage.56 Though not immediately relevant to Cruise Lines International,
the recent Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez57 case focused on whether a
fee charged by the City of Valdez was best characterized as a duty of
tonnage, or a property tax.58 Similarly, courts have distinguished “service

54. See id. at 686.
55. See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 34 (1867) (holding
that a fee charged of every ship entering the port does not fall into the exceptions
to the general rule designating regulation of commerce among the states to
Congress).
56. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 700 (“[A] property tax levied on a vessel might
not be a ‘duty of tonnage’ because it would not be a duty at all.”). When
determining whether a tax to a vessel is a property tax, courts try to determine
whether the vessel was taxed at an equal rate as compared to other properties in
any given municipality. Id. at 701–07.
57. 557 U.S. 1 (2009). Some scholars have credited this case with reviving
interest in the Tonnage Clause. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 670 (“The Tonnage
Clause has been understudied in recent years. One reason that law reviews are
not filled with articles on the Clause is that it had largely disappeared from
judicial dockets.”). Tonnage Clause cases were quite common, even in the U.S.
Supreme Court, during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Id. Then,
beginning in 1935, almost seventy-five years passed without a Tonnage Clause
case reaching the Supreme Court. Id. The last Supreme Court case about the
Tonnage Clause, before Polar Tankers, was Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex
rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 266 (1935). Tonnage Clause cases have not
been entirely absent from state courts during this period, though they have not
been particularly common. A search for the exact term “Tonnage Clause” in
LexisNexis as of February 22, 2019, delivered fifty-one cases, approximately onehalf of which were decided in the ten years since the Polar Tankers decision. This
simple measurement is illustrative of the resurgence in Tonnage Clause interest.
58. See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. 1 (2009). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Valdez charge violated the Tonnage Clause and was not a permissible property
tax, though the Court was divided as to the reasoning. The plurality opinion,
which was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and
Kennedy, determined that the charge was not a permissible property tax because
it did not reach vessels “in the same manner” as it did other personal property. Id.
at 1–16. Justice Alito concurred, writing that even if the Tonnage Clause permits
a true, evenhanded property tax on the vessels, the tax here did not qualify as one,
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fees” as a type of charge that is not normally implicated by the Tonnage
Clause.59
Service fees are those that a ship is charged “for services rendered to
and enjoyed by the vessel.”60 If a city or state charges a visiting vessel for
entering its ports, it does not violate the Tonnage Clause so long as the
vessel received something in return that is reasonably related to the value
of the charge; the charge in such a case is a service fee and not a duty of
tonnage.61 Ironically, this exception applies even if the tax is assessed, and
graduated, according to a vessel’s tonnage.62
Case law around the service fee exception has shown that courts
often act deferentially when applying the rule.63 While the legislature
should not describe a charge as a “service fee” if it does not give a
reciprocal service to the vessels, some courts have gone to great lengths
to avoid second-guessing a legislature’s characterization of a fee.64
Deference, of course, is not guaranteed. The ultimate question that courts
ask to determine if a charge is a service fee is whether the charge acts as a
quid pro quo.65 If a charge is primarily intended to raise revenue for a
community, the charge is a tax or duty,66 but if it renders an equal service
to the vessel, it is acceptable under the Tonnage Clause.67 One example of
a common, qualifying class of service fees are fees paid for pilotage (i.e.,
the process of directing the movement of a ship by observations of

and was thus an unconstitutional duty of tonnage. Id. at 19–20. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas also agreed that the charge was a duty of tonnage,
but in their view, the personal property tax exception to the Tonnage Clause
should not exist; thus Alaska could not circumvent the Tonnage Clause with such
taxes here, whether or not the statute discriminated against visiting tankers. Id. at
17–19. Justices Souter and Stevens were the lone dissenters, finding that the charge
was a traditional property tax and thus acceptable under Tonnage Clause
jurisprudence. Id. at 20–28.
59. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261,
266 (1935).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 427–30 (1879) (The
charges “were exacted and paid as compensation for the use of an improved
wharf.”).
62. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 707.
63. Id. at 708.
64. Id. (describing Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882), “where the
Supreme Court refused to look beyond the language of a municipal ordinance.
The ordinance characterized a charge imposed on vessels using city docks as a
wharfage fee, with the measure of the charge determined by the tonnage of the
vessel, and the Court, over one dissent, looked no further.”).
65. Id. at 703.
66. See, e.g., State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 220 (1870)
(“Beyond question the act is an act to raise revenue without any corresponding or
equivalent benefit or advantage to the vessels taxed.”).
67. Id.
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recognizable landmarks).68 Similarly, wharfage fees69 qualify as service
fees and do not implicate the Tonnage Clause.70
Other fees have also qualified as fair service fees. For example, in
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission, the Supreme
Court found that a fee used to police the harbor qualified as a service fee
even though it was assessed based on the vessel’s tonnage.71 The Court
reasoned that although the benefit to the ships was not as direct as in the
pilotage and wharfage cases, the vessels nonetheless received a clear
benefit because the local government’s police activities ensured the safety
of the vessels. As described below, Juneau failed to convince the court in
Cruise Lines International that its charges would qualify as a service fee,
and thus, implicated the Tonnage Clause.

II. CLIAA LITIGATION
In Cruise Lines International, the District Court of Alaska held that
Juneau’s use of passenger fees collected from visiting cruise vessels
violated the Tonnage Clause.72 In coming to this conclusion, the court first
determined that the fees fell among the general class of charges that were
prohibited under the Tonnage Clause.73 The court then assessed whether
the fees would qualify as a “service fee,” and ultimately concluded that

68. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding a
pilotage fee imposed upon vessels by the Port of Philadelphia). The Court noted
that imposts on tonnage were “known to the commerce of a civilized world to be
as distinct from fees and charges for pilotage . . . as they were from charges for
wharfage or towage, or any other local port charges for services rendered to
vessels or cargoes.” Id. at 314.
69. According to the Federal Maritime Commission, “[w]harfage means a
charge assessed against the cargo or vessel on all cargo passing or conveyed over,
onto, or under wharves or between vessels and (to or from barge, lighter, or
water), when berthed at wharf or moored in slip adjacent to wharf. Wharfage is
solely the charge for use of wharf and does not include charges for any other
service.” FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, 46 CFR § 525.1(c)(23) (2018).
70. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 88 (1877) (stating a fee based on tonnage
imposed for docking at the town’s wharf could not be considered a duty of
tonnage); Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 429 (1879) (upholding
wharfage fees based on tonnage because they were “paid as compensation for the
use of an improved wharf and not for the mere privilege of stopping at the port”
and were “reasonable in amount”); see also Suozzi, supra note 34, at 292 (“The
Constitutional Framers could not, when they drafted the Tonnage Clause, have
‘had in mind charges for services rendered or for conveniences furnished to
vessels in port, which are facilities to commerce rather than hindrances to its
freedom.’”) (citation omitted).
71. 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
72. See generally Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 210665 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018).
73. Id. at *10.
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they did not.74 Though the court ruled that the fees were not per se
violations of the clause, the City was enjoined from using these fees on
anything other than services to the cruise vessels themselves.75
Ultimately, however, Juneau settled the litigation with CLIAA. The terms
of this settlement allow the City to continue collecting and spending
passenger fees, subject to several restrictions described below.
A. Juneau Passenger Fees
The City of Juneau owns and operates two of the four cruise ship
docks that are located in downtown Juneau.76 Each year, between May
and September, approximately 1,000,000 cruise ship passengers enter the
City through these docks, and the City collects about $8,000,000 in
passenger fee revenue.77 The passenger fees Juneau levies are comprised
of two separate fees: a Marine Passenger Fee (MPF), and a Port
Development Fee (PDF).78 In its complaint, CLIAA collectively referred to
these fees as “Entry Fees” and claimed that both fees were being collected
and used in violation of the Tonnage Clause.79
The MPF was first instituted on October 5, 1999, after Juneau voters
approved the fee through a public initiative.80 The MPF charges cruise
lines a $5.00 fee per cruise vessel passenger.81 By design, the MPF was
appropriated in support of the marine passenger ship industry, though it
was also intended to be used to mitigate the impact of tourism on local

74. Id. at *14.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *2 (Juneau “owns and operates the Cruise Ship Terminal and the
Alaska Steam Ship Dock . . . the other two cruise ship docks, AJ Juneau Dock and
Franklin Dock, are privately owned.”).
77. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8,
Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 16) (“From Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal
Year 2016, CBJ has levied and collected more than $35 million in Entry Fees from
the Cruise Lines.”).
78. Id. at 5–6.
79. Id. at 5–6, 9.
80. Marine Passenger Fee Program, THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU,
https://beta.juneau.org/manager/marine-passenger-fee-program (last visited
May 1, 2019) (This was called the Marine Passenger Fee Initiative, Proposition 1
and was passed by a public vote.).
81. CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA, CODE CH. 69.20 et seq. [hereinafter
JUNEAU CODE].
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infrastructure.82 Revenues from the MPF are placed in the Marine
Passenger Fee Special Revenue Fund.83
The second fee, the PDF, was passed in April 2002, and imposed a
fee of $1.73 per arriving passenger, per day, on vessels carrying
passengers for compensation that are not otherwise exempt.84 On January
1, 2007, a second resolution increased the fee to $3.00.85 Revenues from
the PDF are placed in the Port Development Special Revenue Fund.86 This
fund, which is overseen by the City Manager, “shall be used for capital
improvements to the downtown waterfront for the provision of service to
the cruise ship industry.”87
The City of Juneau has used the MPF and PDF fees to fund a variety
of projects and services.88 Part of the MPF is allocated towards city
services like libraries, police, the Parks and Recreation Department, the
hospital, the City Finance Department, and the City Manager’s Office.89
Other parts of the MPF are earmarked for specific services, such as
downtown foot and bike police patrols, weather monitoring, downtown
restroom cleaning, sidewalk maintenance, pay phones, security, tourism
training services, and Air Medevacs.90 Portions of the fees also go directly
to the docks, harbors, and general building operations.91 For example, a
large portion of the PDF has funded the 16B project, which involved the
construction of a new public dock and the reconstruction of the Alaska
Steamship Wharf.92 Both funds have been used on the waterfront
Seawalk, along with associated capital projects, like the large, bronze
whale.93

82. See JUNEAU CODE § 69.20.005 (The MPF was designed to “address the costs
to the City and Borough for services and infrastructure usage by cruise ship
passengers visiting the City and Borough, including emergency services,
transportation impacts and recreation infrastructure use, and to mitigate impacts
of increased utilization of City and Borough services by cruise ship passengers.”).
83. JUNEAU CODE § 69.20.120(a) (“The fees collected under this chapter shall
be placed in the marine passenger fund.”).
84. City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2150.
85. City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2294(b)am. While this provision was
originally only temporary, the sunset of this resolution was repealed several years
later. City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2423(b)am.
86. City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2423(b)am § 1(c)(3) (“Proceeds of
the fee shall be placed in the Port Development Fund.”).
87. See id. § 1. Port Development Fee.
88. Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
210665, at *4−6 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018).
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *7 n.33.
93. Id. at *6 n.27.

36.1 RUSSIAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

90

5/20/2019 1:50 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

B. The Litigants’ Arguments
1. Should the Tonnage Clause Apply?
In their argument, CLIAA likened the passenger fees to the oil tax
that the Supreme Court recently struck down in Polar Tankers.94 Like the
Valdez ordinance in that case, the passenger fees only apply to ships of a
certain size that call at the port, and failure to pay the fee can result in the
vessel being barred from entry to Juneau.95 CLIAA argued that because
the charges are calculated and assessed based on the ships’ cargo—i.e.,
how many passengers the ship is carrying—the fees fall squarely within
the historical understanding of the Tonnage Clause.96 Just as Valdez
assessed fees directly to the ship in Polar Tanker, Juneau assesses fees
directly to the ships, and not to the passengers individually in this case.97
On the other hand, Juneau argued that the Polar Tanker’s analysis
should not apply to the cruise ships that enter their port because they are
inherently different than the oil tankers and other vessels that fall within
the scope of the Tonnage Clause.98 In other words, Juneau argued on
policy grounds that the Tonnage Clause should not protect cruise ships
from fees because of the very nature of their industry.99 Juneau believed
that a key part of the Tonnage Clause analysis was about whether the port
was using its fees against a vessel from “less advantageously situated
parts of the country” and that tourism was not the kind of commerce the
clause was meant to protect.100
2. Should Passenger Fees Fall Under the Service Fee Exception?
Juneau also argued that the passenger fees in this case were best
characterized as service fees rather than as duties of tonnage.101 Just as
there has been no bright-line rule as to what counts as tonnage,102 courts
have been unclear about what constitutes a service to a vessel. While the
94. See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment & Opposition to City & Borough of Juneau’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment at 9–16, Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 148).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 50–52, Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 118).
99. Id.
100. See id. (arguing that there is no evidence that the passenger fees are “local
hindrances to trade and carriage by vessels”).
101. Id. at 54.
102. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 15, at 673.
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most common service fees are pilotage and wharfage fees, some courts
have upheld fees that were directed towards services such as the policing
of harbors and vessels,103 or to cover the cost of unloading a ship’s
cargo.104 Juneau argued that the only difference here is that the “cargo”
for cruise lines is their passengers.105 Consequently, they believe that the
money spent on crossing guards, local infrastructure, and other services
benefits the vessel both directly and indirectly via their passengers.106 It is
on this basis that they insist the passenger fees are actually service fees.107
CLIAA argued that Juneau’s concept of service fees is too broad and
antithetical to the goals of the Tonnage Clause. Specifically, they believe
that the clause only allows fees for commercial-like services rendered to
a vessel.108 Permissible services include only those that enable a vessel’s
movement in the flow of commerce, such as the regulation of harbor
traffic, pilotage, wharfage, the use of locks on a navigable river, medical
inspection of vessels, or emergency services for vessels (fire prevention,
security, etc.).109 Fees for these types of services “are allowed because they
do not impede a vessel’s free navigation in commerce and are only levied
when a ‘passing vessel’ elects to use those services.”110 CLIAA argued, on
policy grounds, that it is important not to extend the permissible bounds
of fees acceptable under the Tonnage Clause because it would open the
door to abuse.111 By allowing passenger fees here, they claimed that any
municipality could charge fees to vessels so long as they could show that
the fees were used to benefit someone or something in the community.112

103. Id. at 707 (citing Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks
Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 263 (1935)).
104. See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
supra note 98, at 54 n.194. (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 314
(1851)).
105. Id. at 54.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment & Opposition to City & Borough of Juneau’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 16.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. (citing Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 805 F.3d
98, 108 (3d Cir. 2015)).
111. Id. at 21 (“More alarming than CBJ’s stretching of settled jurisprudence,
however, is the far-reaching mischief in which states and localities will be able to
engage should this Court find that any ‘charge [assessed against vessels] for
services or conveniences provided’ is permissible under the Tonnage Clause,
regardless of the service’s or convenience’s connection to the vessel.”).
112. Id.
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C. The District Court’s Opinion and the Path Forward for Juneau
Ultimately, the District Court of Alaska adopted CLIAA’s Tonnage
Clause analysis. Citing to Polar Tankers, the court reasoned that because
the fees are imposed upon the vessels themselves,113 the Tonnage Clause
would apply to the passenger fees.114 Similarly, the court said that while
the Tonnage Clause does have an exception for service fees,115 the services
had to benefit the vessel itself.116 The court rejected Juneau’s argument that
the exception would also apply to services that were beneficial to the
passengers of a vessel.117 Indeed, the court said that passenger benefits
were tangential to the analysis.118 Because the passenger fees were used
on general city services, many of which benefited cruise line tourists but
not the ships themselves, Juneau’s use of the fees was in violation of the
Tonnage Clause.119
1. Effect of the Decision
The District Court of Alaska decided that the MPF and PDF were not
per se unconstitutional, and that Juneau could continue to collect these
fees.120 However, the court enjoined the City from spending the fees on
services that do not benefit the cruise vessels.121 The court did not
enumerate which specific spending practices Juneau would need to
discontinue, and immediately after the opinion, the City publicly
contended that it would not need to change many of its spending
practices.122 However, if the court were to clarify its opinion, Juneau
113. Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
210665, at *11 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018) (stating that the Tonnage Clause “seeks to
prevent states with ‘convenient ports’ from placing other States at an economic
disadvantage by laying levies that would ‘ta[x] the consumption of their
neighbors’”) (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. 1, 7
(2009)).
114. Id. at *11–12 (The court wrote further that “[t]he prohibition against
tonnage duties has been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties regardless of the
name or form, and even though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel which
operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading, or lying in port.”)
(citing Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8).
115. Id. at *16 (noting that “the Tonnage Clause does not prohibit the
imposition and expenditure of fees imposed upon a vessel that reflect the costs of
services provided to a vessel or which further the vessel’s marine enterprise”).
116. Id. at *16–19.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Suzanne Downing, Are Juneau officials misleading public about cruise
industry lawsuit?, MUST READ ALASKA (Jan. 26, 2019), http://mustreadalaska.com

36.1 RUSSIAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

PROTECTING PASSENGER FEES

5/20/2019 1:50 PM

93

would likely need to discontinue its spending on services like crossing
guards, police bike and foot patrol, security lighting, security services,
and infrastructure investments.123 These services benefit the City and the
tourists arriving by cruise vessels, but not the actual vessels themselves.124
Similarly, the City would likely be prevented from using the funds on any
future capital projects like the Seawalk or 16B—even where these projects
are focused on harbor and dock maintenance—because they are probably
not sufficiently relevant to the vessel to qualify as a “service fee.”125
2. A Settlement for the City
In light of the sustained divisiveness over the City’s spending
practices, and the continued threat of an appeal,126 Juneau announced a

/are-juneau-officials-misleading-public-about-cruise-industry-lawsuit/.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Because the judge did not specify which projects violated the Tonnage
Clause, city officials in Juneau were uncertain about how they could continue to
spend the passenger fees in the future. See, e.g., Jacob Resneck, Ruling Limits How
Juneau Can Spend Cruise Passenger Fees, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.ktoo.org/2018/12/06/ruling-limits-how-juneau-can-spendcruise-passenger-fees/. The Juneau City Manager said that the City does not
“know exactly what this means yet and we’re still trying to digest the sum total
of [the judge’s] order.” Id. To further investigate, Juneau opened the issue for
public comment. Mollie Barnes, City Accepting Proposals for Marine Passenger Fee
Proceeds, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/
city-accepting-proposals-for-marine-passenger-fee-proceeds/.
126. Multiple Alaska municipalities offered to support Juneau’s litigation fees
if the City were to appeal this litigation. See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20,
at 2 (“WHEREAS, other communities in Southeast Alaska are concerned about the
impact of the Court Rulings on their communities and have voluntarily offered
the CBJ monetary support to appeal the Court Rulings”). Though unavailing in
the District Court, the policy arguments that Juneau put forward may be
successful in an appellate court. Particularly, the District Court of Alaska, when
identifying the underlying policies behind the Tonnage Clause, said that the
service fee exception is justified because it “further[s] the marine enterprise” of a
vessel. Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
210665, at *16 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018). The court was correct that this has typically
only applied to fees that benefit the vessel itself. See id. at 16. However, an
appellate court might be more likely to rule that, in this context, benefits to
passengers help to achieve that underlying goal. Indeed, because the citizens of
Juneau and other Alaska cities are disproportionately outnumbered by the
tourists who visit their cities, investments in infrastructure near the ports may be
said to benefit the tourists more than the townspeople themselves. Under that
view, a court might agree that because the fees are being spent to draw more
tourists to Alaska by increasing the state’s beauty, the investment is being used in
service of the cruise vessels’ “marine enterprise.” This would be a novel
argument, but the cruise industry did not exist when the Tonnage Clause was
written, and there is certainly room to interpret the clause more broadly than it
has been interpreted, historically. That said, an appeal would have been a costly
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settlement with CLIAA in March 2019.127 Under the terms of this
agreement, the City could collect passenger fees without further objection
from CLIAA.128 The City could continue to use these passenger fees to
provide services and infrastructure to cruise ships including restrooms,
signage, wayfinding, motor coach staging, crossing guards, fire and
emergency medical services, and police patrols.129 Moreover, it may
continue to develop the downtown waterfront in accordance with the
Long Range Waterfront Plan.130 In exchange, the City agreed that the
passenger fees would not increase for the next three years,131 and that the
City would consult with CLIAA before raising the fees after that term.132
The Agreement would last for renewing ten year periods, subject to
written termination by either of the parties.133 This settlement agreement
was heralded by both the City and CLIAA as a fair and equitable
conclusion to three years of litigation.134

III. THE EFFECT OF CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL ON ALASKA
TOURISM AND PASSENGER FEES
This Note argues that the District Court of Alaska’s holding in Cruise
Lines International is dangerous because it may ultimately reduce or
destroy Juneau and Alaska’s ability to profit from cruise tourism. Tourism
and cruise revenue are among the largest sources of revenue for the State
of Alaska.135 Traditionally, passenger fees have been a primary
endeavor, and Juneau would be fighting an uphill battle with unclear chances of
success.
127. See CBJ and CLIA reach tentative agreement, ending further litigation, CITY
AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU (Mar. 14, 2019), https://beta.juneau.org/newsroomitem/cbj-and-clia-reach-tentative-agreement-ending-further-litigation.
128. See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 4-7 (describing the fee
collection and spending practices which the parties agreed are acceptable).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. (“The Parties agree for each and every Fiscal Year, the Parties shall
endeavor to meet in person to discuss in good-faith any new proposed projects
and services for which Fees are sought to be expended in the following Fiscal Year
with the ultimate decision resting with the Assembly.”).
133. Id. at 8 (“The term of this Agreement shall be ten years from the effective
date with automatic ten year renewals unless either Party provides written notice
to the other, sixty days prior to the renewal date, to terminate this Agreement.”).
134. See Ben Hohenstatt, City and cruise line make lawsuit settlement official,
JUNEAU EMPIRE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/city-andcruise-line-make-lawsuit-settlement-official/.
135. See ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., AND ECON. DEV., 2017 ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF ALASKA’S VISITOR INDUSTRY 2 (2018), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/
web/Portals/6/pub/TourismResearch/VisitorImpacts2016-17Report11_2_18
.pdf?ver=2018-11-14-120855-690 (“The 43,300 jobs connected to Alaska’s visitor
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mechanism for revenue collection in Juneau and for Alaska.136 Though the
settlement bars CLIAA from litigating against Juneau’s passenger fees for
ten years, it leaves other Alaska laws exposed to future suits,137 and thus,
may ultimately be disruptive to the Alaska economy.138 Moreover, the
terms of the settlement seem to leave the passenger fees open to attack,
simply at a later date.139 This Section argues that in light of the state’s past
dealings with the cruise industry, the holding in Cruise Line International,
and the subsequent settlement agreement represent an unsatisfactory
outcome for the City. Ultimately, the City should seek additional
protections to safeguard its tourism interests.
A. Alaska Tourism
Tourism benefits the state economy in direct and indirect ways.
Indirectly, tourism generates revenue in the form of increased economic
activity and job growth. Visiting tourists rent vehicles, use local lodging,
take tours, buy gifts, and consume food and beverages.140 Individual
municipalities often benefit from this spending.141 Tourism also leads to
growth through the development of local jobs. In Juneau, the tourism
industry is one of the largest employers in the city, and the sector
continues to grow.142 It is similarly large in Sitka,143 where a community
industry represented 10 percent of total statewide employment in 2017. Total
visitor industry-related labor income of $1.5 billion represented 5 percent of the
statewide total.”).
136. See e.g., ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2018),
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/AnnualReport.aspx?
Year=2017#program40170 (showing that the state’s CPV excise tax is one of the
state’s ten largest sources of revenue).
137. See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 2 (“The Parties also
acknowledge that CBJ’s Marine Passenger Fee and Port Development Fee are fees
imposed upon a vessel, and not fees imposed upon a passenger like the State
Commercial Passenger Vessel excise tax.”).
138. See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., supra note 136 (The CPV
passenger fee collected by the state accounted for almost 2% of the state’s total
revenue and was the only item in the state’s official statement of revenues
collected which explicitly accounted for tourism revenue).
139. See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 8.
140. See 2017 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALASKA’S VISITOR INDUSTRY, supra note 135,
at 10–11. These activities collectively accounted for $2.2 billion in visitor spending.
Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 3 (“Revenues accruing to municipalities from Alaska’s out-of-state
visitor industry are estimated at $88.5 million in 2017, including $37.6 million in
sales tax revenues, $32.2 million in lodging tax revenues, and $17.8 million in
dockage/moorage payments.”).
142. See e.g., TRAVEL JUNEAU, JUNEAU VISITOR PROFILE AND ECONOMIC IMPARCT
STUDY 2016 5 (2016) (noting that “[v]isitor industry spending-related employment
(2,800 jobs) represented roughly 12 percent of total Juneau employment”).
143. See Evan Jordan et al., Coping with Tourism: The Case of Sitka, Alaska, TRAVEL
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of only 9000 people accommodates around 250,000 cruise passengers
every year.144 The tourism industry employed about 14% of Sitka’s
workforce and accounted for about nine percent of total work earnings in
the city in 2016.145 Cruise tourism has also become the dominant industry
in Ketchikan.146
The primary economic benefits of cruise tourism come from
revenues generated via direct payments from the cruise industry to the
cities and state. Just as the state charges the oil industry for its production,
the mining industry for licensing fees, and the fishing industry for catch
size, the state uses passenger fees to collect its fair share from the cruise
industry.147 These fees are the only mechanism by which state and local
governments collect “direct” tourism revenue, and thus, they are
incredibly important for the state’s economy.148 In 2017, for example, state
taxes levied upon cruise vessels through the Alaska Commercial
Passenger Vessel (CPV) Excise Tax accounted for almost two percent of
the state’s total revenue.149 At the municipal level, the CPV and passenger
fees combined represent nearly five percent of some city budgets.150

AND TOURISM RESEARCH ASS’N

(2016) https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1672&context=ttra (“Sitka is an island community in
[southeast] Alaska, populated by slightly less than 9,000 residents as of the turn
of the millennium, making it the fourth largest city in Alaska.”). The citizens live
with a ratio of one resident for every twenty-five cruise passengers. See id.
144. Id.; see also CITY OF SITKA, SITKA COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 2030, PUBLIC
HEARING DRAFT (2018), http://www.cityofsitka.com/government/departments/
planning/documents/TechnicalPlanDraft8Feb2018.pdf.
145. Id. at 45. This equals about 800 workers and $23 million. See id.
146. See CITY OF KETCHIKAN, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR
THE
FISCAL
YEAR
ENDED
DECEMBER
31,
2016
5
(2017),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/dcra/dcrarepoext/RepoPubs/FinDocs/Ke
tchikanCY2016Audit.pdf (“Ketchikan’s most dominant economic sector is
tourism and its popularity as a major port of call for large cruise ships and their
passengers continues to grow.”).
147. See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2018),
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/AnnualReport.aspx?
Year=2017#program40170 (showing that oil, mining and fishing create a large
portion of the state’s annual revenue; similarly, passenger fees are among the
state’s ten largest sources of revenue).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. In its 2018 biennial budget, Juneau projected that it would have
approximately $320,000,000 in revenue. CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, BIENNIAL
BUDGET ADOPTED FISCAL YEAR 2018 DOC-2 1 (2018), http://www.juneau.org/fin
anceftp/documents/FY18BudgetBookAdopted-ForInternet.pdf. The passenger
fees at issue in this litigation account for approximately $8,000,000 of the total
anticipated revenue. Id. at 33–34. Combined with the $5,000,000 annual passenger
fees collected from the state, these fees represent 4% of the budget.
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B. The Growth of the Alaska Tourism Industry Was Planned
In Cruise Lines International, Juneau argued that CLIAA should not
be able to enjoin the City’s passenger fees because it was the cruise
industry itself that persuaded Juneau to pass those fees.151 Though this
argument was rejected, it has merit. The rise of cruise tourism in Alaska
was a planned process which required Alaska cities to consciously elect
to work with the tourism industry. In Sitka, for example, after the city’s
pulp mill closed in the 1990s, residents carefully weighed their options for
reinvesting in their community.152 They chose to invest in tourism after
meeting and planning with representatives of the cruise industry.153
Similarly, the citizens of Ketchikan consciously turned to cruise tourism
as a community investment after some of its local pulp mills closed in the
1990s.154 The city has focused its development on accommodating this
industry and the tourists that the cruises bring to the city.155 Likewise,
Juneau only agreed to pass the MPF and PDF after the Northwest Cruise
Association endorsed the acts and persuaded the city to use the fees to
maintain local infrastructure.156 In partnership with the cruise
organizations, Sitka, Juneau, and similarly situated port cities invested in
local infrastructure in order to support the annual influx of visitors to the
state.157

151. See generally The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 98. Juneau asserted that CLIAA should be prevented from
pursuing its claims based on theories of waiver, laches, equitable estoppel, and
quasi estoppel. Id.
152. See Evan Jordan, supra note 143, at *5 (“Tourism planning started with a
public forum in 1994 when the pulp mill was closing.”).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Melissa Block, Leaving Timber Behind, An Alaska Town Turns to
Tourism, NPR (May 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/17/528453624/
leaving-timber-behind-an-alaska-town-turns-to-tourism (describing the
transition away from pulp mills).
155. See, e.g., CITY OF KETCHIKAN, supra note 146, at 5 (“The growth in tourism
has led local government and private businesses to make significant investments
in the land-based facilities and port infrastructure necessary to accommodate the
needs of the industry.”).
156. See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 98, at 7–10. A representative of the Northwest Cruise Association, the
Plaintiff’s predecessor, unequivocally endorsed the PDF Resolution when it was
being considered and confirmed the support of colleagues in the industry. Id.
157. See, e.g., CITY OF KETCHIKAN, supra note 146, at 5 (“The City invested over
$40 million in 2006 to expand and improve its port berthing facilities. Private
companies have invested millions of dollars to develop a retail complex at the
former Spruce Mill property and Berth IV and its adjacent ground transportation
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C. Future Threats to Alaska Tourism
In the wake of Cruise Lines International, many laws that provide
direct funding for the state and its port cities may be struck down.158
Admittedly, the cruise lines would likely be reluctant to attack these laws
immediately in the wake of the decision, due to the high costs of litigation
and the associated media scrutiny. However, the cruise lines are not
constrained by their settlement with Juneau from litigating against these
fees.159 If the cruise lines ultimately wanted to attack the CPV excise tax,
the law would be susceptible to the same criticisms that felled Juneau’s
passenger fees in the Alaska District Court. Other port-city passenger
fees, like those charged in Ketchikan, may also be invalidated. If these
laws are struck down, the state and municipal economies that have
become reliant on cruise tourism could be harshly impacted.
1. The Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax
Following the Cruise Lines International decision, cruise lines have a
firm foundation on which to challenge the state’s CPV excise tax.160 Like
the Juneau passenger fees, the CPV excise tax is imposed on passengers
traveling on commercial passenger vessels.161 The $34.50 fee is collected
at the cruise ships’ first port-of-call,162 then the fees are distributed
area. The City recently completed phase three of a $26 million four-phase project
to replace Berths I and II.”).
158. It is possible that the cities and state will unilaterally change their
passenger fee collection and spending practices in order to comply with the
decision. See, e.g., Resneck, supra note 125 (suggesting that the state attorney
general may give guidance to municipalities about how to spend CPV funds).
159. The Settlement Agreement specifically distinguishes Juneau’s Passenger
Fees from the CPV tax. See, Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 2. Moreover,
although the settlement does protect Juneau from litigation by CLIAA or CLIAA’s
successor organizations, it does not protect the city’s passenger fees from
challenges from other third parties. See id.
160. In fact, CLIAA’s predecessor organization, the Alaska Cruise Association,
already challenged the CPV as a violation of the Tonnage Clause in 2009. See
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Alaska Cruise Association v.
Patrick Galvin, No. 3:09-cv- (D. Alaska Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.sitnews.us/
0909news/092109/ComplaintRelief.pdf [hereinafter ACA Complaint]. They only
dropped the lawsuit when Alaska governor Sean Parnell agreed to lower the rate
of the CPV. See 2010 ACA Settlement Agreement, http://www.law.state.ak.
us/pdf/press/041310-ACAagreement.pdf.
161. See ACA Complaint, supra note 160. The CPV only applies to those cruise
lines that provide overnight accommodations, that anchor or moor on the state’s
marine water with the intent to allow passengers to embark or disembark, and in
the cases where a voyage lasts more than seventy-two hours on the state’s marine
water. Id. As a practical matter, this applies to most cruise lines.
162. See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., supra note 136 (“The Department
of Revenue’s Tax Division deposits all proceeds from the CPV excise tax into the
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between the state and the first seven port communities that the ships
visit.163 The cities and boroughs can each receive up to $2.50 per
passenger.164 Between 2007 and 2016, this tax was shared with 17 city or
borough governments.165
The cruise industry has already threatened to challenge the CPV on
one prior occasion.166 In 2009, the Alaska Cruise Association filed a
complaint in the District Court of Alaska against the CPV.167 Their first
claim for relief was that the CPV violated the Tonnage Clause.168 At the
time, they were persuaded to drop the suit when the state agreed to lower
the CPV tax rate.169 Now, however, CLIAA has clear grounds on which to
sue.
If the cruise industry revamps its challenge against the CPV, the law
will likely fall. Like the Juneau passenger fees, there are no clear
restrictions on how cities may use the CPV funds once they are
distributed to the different ports-of-call;170 in many cities, they are
commingled with the city’s general funds.171 Likewise, the state has used
the CPV on a wide variety of projects, many unrelated to the cruise
industry in general.172 A court would likely find that the tax was under
the purview of the Tonnage Clause and that it could not qualify under the
service fee exception, nor any other exception recognized by the courts.173
Commercial Vessel Passenger (CVP) tax account in the General Fund. Subject to
appropriation by the Legislature from this account, the division distributes $5 per
passenger to each of the first seven ports of call in Alaska.”).
163. Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax: Community Needs, Priorities, Shared
Revenue, and Expenditures, ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., AND ECON. DEV. (Feb.
2017) at 2, https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/6/pub/Tourism
Research/00%20FULL%20CPV%20RPT%2016%202017.pdf?ver=2017-03-23160339-903.
164. Id.
165. Id. Overall, these municipalities have shared $114.3 million in CPV excise
tax funding. Id.
166. See ACA Complaint, supra note 160.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 10.
169. See Motter, supra note 23. The state lowered the fee from $46 per passenger
to the current rate of $34.50. Id.
170. See generally Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163
(showing which cities benefit from CPV funding and how these communities use
CPV funds).
171. Id.
172. See ACA Complaint, supra note 160, at 6. Proponents of the CPV explicitly
argued for the law’s passage on the basis that it would help the state raise revenue
by taxing visitors from out of state. Id.
173. One key difference, however, is that the state is not the end-user of the
CPV excise tax fees. See Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163, at
6. Whereas Juneau collected the passenger fees and applied them for its own cityprojects, the state, in most instances, merely collects the fees and redistributes
them between the cities. Id.
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If this happens, Alaska could lose a full two percent of its annual revenue,
and would collect essentially no income directly from the cruise lines or
visitors industry.
2. Ketchikan’s Head Tax
Ketchikan, like Juneau, is one of the most visited port cities in the
state of Alaska. With less than 10,000 full time residents,174 the city
welcomes 1,000,000 visitors every year.175 Like Juneau, the city passed an
additional tax to help it compensate for the burden that the tourism
industry puts on its infrastructure and local services.176 This head tax may
also be susceptible to challenge in the wake of the Cruise Lines International
decision. As with the CPV excise tax and Juneau’s passenger fees,
Ketchikan’s head tax is levied upon ships based on the number of visiting
passengers who enter the city on a cruise vessel.177 Thus, it likely
implicates the Tonnage Clause. That said, the city spends this money in
ways that might allow it to qualify under the service fee exception. For
example, the city initially used the head tax towards paying off city debt
that it accumulated during the construction of Berths 3 and 4 of the
downtown cruise dock.178 The head tax money has also gone directly to
port improvement projects.179 It is unclear whether such projects would
qualify as a service to the vessel, and thus, exempt the fees from violating
the Tonnage Clause; Ketchikan public officials have expressed their doubt
and concern about the issue after the Cruise Lines International ruling.180
D. Alaska Ports Should Be Immune From Future Attack
This Note argues that the cruise industry’s attack on Juneau’s
passenger fees was inequitable, and that a future attack against Alaska’s
174. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION
(2017). According to the 2017 United States census estimates, Ketchikan’s
population is approximately 8,272. Id.
175. See Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163, at 2.
176. See KETCHIKAN, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE No. 13.10.030 (2018) (codifying
imposition of passenger wharfage fees).
177. Id.
178. Leila Kheiry, Head Tax Lawsuit Could Affect Ketchikan, KTOO PUB. MEDIA
(Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.ktoo.org/2016/04/16/head-tax-lawsuit-couldaffect-ketchikan/.
179. Id.
180. See Ketchikan City Officials Mull Cruise Passenger Fee Ruling, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/alaska/articles/2018-12-10/ketchikan-city-officials-mull-cruisepassenger-fee-ruling (stating that reactions among the city council members
“varied from wanting to talk with the industry to perhaps looking at whether to
cap the number [of] passengers who visit”).
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passenger laws would be unfair to the citizens of the state. If the CPV tax,
or other municipal passenger fees are struck down, then Alaska citizens
would bear the sole burden of maintaining their local tourism
infrastructure without support from the cruise industry.181 While the state
would still be able to collect and benefit from “indirect” tourism revenue,
experience has shown that it would not be enough to sustain the expenses
associated with this infrastructure maintenance.182 Moreover, the burdens
on the cities would only grow over time.183 Juneau and other similarly
181. Juneau, for example, will have to continue maintaining downtown
sidewalks, restrooms, etc., as more than 1,000,000 visitors use these amenities
every year.
182. Before Juneau passed the MPF in 1999, there were no direct passenger fees
in Alaska. The City, and the State, passed these laws because their early
relationship with the cruise lines was unsustainable for Alaska municipalities,
and the passenger fees could help the City compensate for the large impact that
the visitors were having on the city:
On certain days, the City may have as many as 5 ships (4 docking and 1
lightering) in port with a potential of more than 10,000 passengers and
crew. This can increase Juneau’s total population by one-third. The vast
majority of cruise ship passengers visiting Juneau are either walking in
the downtown core area or on local shore excursions. Congestion and
noise are the issues that have generated a significant amount of concern.
In response to these concerns, citizens approved a $5 per passenger fee
to mitigate the impacts of large-scale tourism. These fees have been used
for construction and maintenance of additional public restroom facilities,
road and sidewalk improvements, harbor and dock improvements,
increased public transportation service, noise abatement programs,
acquisition of waterfront open space, public trail maintenance and
security improvements.
JUNEAU FIN. DEP’T, BUDGET HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 13 (2009), http://www.juneau.
org/finance/FY08AdoptedBudget/Overview-Budget_History_Overview
_FY08_Adpt.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018).
183. The Alaska cruise industry has doubled in size over the last 20 years. See
History
of
Alaska
Cruise
Industry,
CRUISE
LINE
INT’L
ASS’N,
http://www.cliaalaska.org/economy/alaska-cruise-history/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2019). In 1998, 560,000 tourists entered the state via cruise line, yet 1.2 million
visitors were expected to visit in 2018. Id. If that growth continues, Alaska could
expect to host more than 2 million annual cruise-line visitors by 2035. During this
period, the cruise companies have earned unprecedented profits. See James
DeTar, Here’s Why the Big 3 Cruise Lines are Seeing Strong Profits and Rising Stock
Prices, Forbes (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesdetar/
2017/08/14/heres-why-the-big-3-cruise-lines-are-seeing-strong-profits-andrising-stock-prices/#6719b04c214c (stating that the cruise lines that are members
of CLIAA are experiencing record-breaking profits); see also Here’s How Much
Cruise Ships Make Off Every Passenger, CRUZELY (Dec. 17, 2016),
https://www.cruzely.com/heres-how-much-money-cruise-ships-make-offevery-passenger-infographic/ (showing annual profits of $665,000,000 for Royal
Caribbean International, a CLIAA member cruise line). Conversely, the
populations of cities like Juneau, Sitka, and Ketchikan have remained remarkably
stagnant over the last twenty years. See ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE
DEV., 2018 POPULATION ESTIMATES BY BOROUGH, CENSUS AREA, AND ECONOMIC
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situated cities would need to find new ways to compensate for this loss in
revenue, which may be a difficult task.184 This is not what the state
bargained for and it is not fair to Alaska citizens. The cruise lines should
not be able to escape their obligations to Alaska, either now, or in ten
years, by arguing for the invalidation of the very law they induced the
state to pass. Alaska should look to the U.S. Congress for protection
against future abuse.

IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT TO LEVY A DUTY OF TONNAGE
This Note argues that the City and State should be prepared to seek
congressional authorization for the collection of passenger fees. Congress
could use its power under the Tonnage Clause to grant Alaska, Juneau,
and other similarly situated Alaska ports with a special permission to
charge passenger fees; such action would benefit both the state and the
cruise lines. For the state, whose economy is uniquely intertwined with
tourism, express permission to charge passenger fees for a certain period
would protect an important revenue stream against future attacks.
Similarly, for the City of Juneau, congressional action would serve as a
back-stop for their recent settlement agreement, protecting the fees from
attack by third parties or from a sudden withdrawal by CLIAA from the
agreement (e.g., at the conclusion of the first ten year renewal period).
Finally, congressional action would benefit the cruise lines themselves by
pegging the state fees at a set rate. This is important because an amicable
solution that benefits both the state and the cruise industry could preserve
their public-private partnership and prevent future discord.

REGION, http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/pop/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). If
cruise lines continue to bring tourists into Alaska at increased rates, the burden
on each individual Alaska citizen will be intensified.
184. In order to make up for the lost revenue, Alaska cities could pass a
seasonal sales tax, cut budgeted spending, or draw from the state’s Permanent
Dividend Fund. The state considered each of these options when trying to manage
its recent fiscal crisis, yet found each to be wildly unpopular with the state’s
citizens. See, e.g., Alana Samuels, The Stingiest State in the Union, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/
alaska-budget-crisis/402775/ (describing intense opposition to some efforts to
reduce the state’s budget deficit); Anne Hillman, Anchorage Students Rally Against
Education Funding Cuts, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.alaska
public.org/2015/04/16/anchorage-students-rally-against-education-fundingcuts/. Ultimately, the problem with any of these solutions is that the costs of
maintenance would be unfairly imposed on the Alaska citizens, while the cruise
industry continues to reap the benefits of the cities’ investments.
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A. A Model Tonnage Act
This Note offers a model for endowing Alaska cities with the power
to collect duties of tonnage for a period of twenty years. In Appendix I, it
proposes a model act for passage. This proposal would give Juneau,
Ketchikan, and the State of Alaska the ability to continue charging fees to
cruise vessels based on the number of passengers that they bring to port.
These fees would be set at a standard rate based on the current charges
issued by the Alaska port cities; they would last for a period of twenty
years.
This model law is based on the only prior law in which Congress
expressly authorized a city to assess a duty of tonnage.185 Specifically, in
1804, South Carolina persuaded Congress to pass a law authorizing the
state to collect tonnage duties to fund local hospital services.186 This bill
utilizes the language of that Act to achieve the same goal.187 Like the prior
law, it enumerates the local ordinances and names specifically which
provisions it intends to authorize for passage. It also specifically states the
fee rate at which the cities are allowed to charge passenger fees. As with
the original provision, the law specifically describes which agents are
authorized to collect the taxes from the cruise lines. Whereas the South
Carolina law was passed for a period of three years, this model act
authorizes Juneau, Ketchikan, and the Alaska state government to
implement its fees for a period of twenty years. This period would allow
the cities to plan around the future costs that they may have to bear if the
cruise industry resumes its attack on Alaska passenger fees.188
B. Overcoming Barriers to Passage: A Wary Congress
One of the biggest barriers to the successful passage of a Tonnage
Clause statute is that it is not entirely clear what congressional action
looks like. Congress has only granted a state the power to impose a
tonnage duty once, for a brief period of time, more than two centuries

185. See Act of Dec. 21, 1804, 2 ACTS OF THE GEN. ASS’Y OF S.C. 553–55 (seeking
consent of Congress to charge a duty of tonnage so it may “erect[] and support[]
an [sic] hospital in the vicinity of Charleston for the reception and relief of sick
and disabled seamen”).
186. Id.
187. See infra Appendix I.
188. Of course, if policymakers see wisdom in allowing municipalities to
continue spending passenger fees as they please, this model law can be
reauthorized after its initial passage.
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ago.189 Similarly, there is no evidence that any court has upheld a state
statute or ordinance based on an implicit authorization from Congress.190
It is unclear why Congress has not wielded its power to grant states
the authority to collect tonnage duties on more than one occasion. One
possibility is that states simply have not asked Congress to authorize
state-tonnage duties in the past.191 Alternatively, Congress may be
hesitant to use the power because it has only been used once, is untested,
and could have uncertain effects on interstate commerce.192 Congress may
also be concerned about a slippery slope issue: that by offering one state
(e.g., Alaska) the ability to charge passenger fees to cruise lines, they
would have to let all U.S. coastal states and port cities do the same.
Congress may simply have no incentive to act where the benefit is only to
an individual state and not the nation as a whole.
Although it would likely require considerable efforts on the part of
Alaska to persuade Congress to pass a law authorizing passenger fees,
the payoff would be worthwhile. As demonstrated above, Alaska and its
port cities are facing a difficult predicament and congressional action
would result in significant benefits. Unlike other port cities in “the lower
forty-eight,” where only a small percentage of visitors arrive to the city
by cruise lines,193 Alaska cities are reliant on the cruise and tourism
industries.194 Overall, the U.S. Congress is best positioned to solve this
problem. The state has the incentive to initiate lobbying efforts and a
model law by which to act. All they need is congressional support.

189. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672. This occurred when South Carolina
sought Congress’ approval to charge a duty of tonnage so it could erect a hospital
near Charleston. Congress permitted the city to collect a duty of tonnage for up to
three years. Id.
190. Id.
191. This is hard to measure because many lobbying efforts are not open to
public disclosure. However, if a state had tried to do this, they might have
followed South Carolina’s lead by publicly asking for congressional support. See
Jensen, supra note 15, at 672 (describing how South Carolina “sought consent” for
its tonnage duties). The author could find no public records of any state asking
for such support.
192. See supra Part I (discussing the Framers’ intentions for the Constitution).
193. For example, Seattle, Los Angeles, and other port cities are much less
reliant on cruise-tourism revenue. Indeed, many port cities in the contiguous
United States are easily accessible via plane, highway, or train, in addition to
cruise-line passage. But see U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, KEY WEST HARBOR
RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, APPENDIX A 6 (2010), http://www.cityofkeywestfl.gov/egov/documents/1372338411_97252.pdf. Key West is a more isolated port
city that is reliant on cruise tourism. For cities like Key West, there may be strong
arguments for passing similar Tonnage Clause-authorizing statutes, however,
that discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
194. See supra Part III.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a model law under which Congress could grant
Alaska and its port cities the authority to charge passenger fees to visiting
cruise lines without violating the Tonnage Clause. Because Alaska and its
ports are uniquely reliant on cruise tourism, this would be an
advantageous solution that would protect the Alaska economy. It would
also yield benefits to the cruise lines. It is time for Congress to reawaken
its Tonnage Clause authorizing powers.
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APPENDIX 1:
MODEL LAW TO GRANT TONNAGE CLAUSE POWERS TO ALASKA
An act declaring the consent of Congress to grant Alaska’s State Legislature
and its Cities the power to impose and collect a duty of tonnage from vessels
entering its ports.
Preamble.
The State of Alaska, founded in 1959, is geographically separate and
apart from the contiguous United States, and is uniquely reliant on
tourism revenue for its sustained economic survival. The Tonnage Clause
shall not impede the State’s collection of this revenue.
This Law grants the State of Alaska, and its duly authorized cities
Juneau and Ketchikan, with the right to continue collecting and
appropriating fees from cruise lines for reinvestment in local
infrastructure and tourism projects, without violating the Tonnage
Clause.
SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the consent of
Congress be granted and declared to:
(A) the operation of Ordinance No. 2000-01am by the City
Council of Juneau, passed by popular initiative on October
5 in the year 1999 titled “Marine Passenger Fee,” so far as the
same extends to authorizing the City Council of Juneau to
impose and levy a duty not exceeding $5.00, per passenger,
on all ships and vessels of the United States, which shall
arrive and be entered in the port of Juneau from any foreign
port;
(B) the operation of Res. No. 2294(b)am by the City Council of
Juneau, passed in April of the year 2002 titled “Port
Development Fee,” so far as the same extends to authorizing
the City Council of Juneau to impose and levy a duty not
exceeding $3.00, per passenger, on all ships and vessels of
the United States, which shall arrive and be entered in the
port of Juneau from any foreign port;
(C) the operation of Ordinance No. 13.10.030 by the City Council
of Ketchikan, passed on January 1 in the year 2007 titled
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“Passenger Wharfage Fee,” so far as the same extends to
authorizing the City Council of Juneau to impose and levy a
duty not exceeding $7.00, per passenger, on all ships and
vessels of the United States, which shall arrive and be
entered in the port of Ketchikan from any foreign port;
(D) the operation of Alaska Statutes 43.52.200–295 by the State
legislature of Alaska, passed on December 17 in the year
2006 titled “Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax,” so far
as the same extends to authorizing the Alaska Port Cities to
impose and levy a duty of $34.50, per passenger, of all ships
and vessels of the United States, which shall arrive and be
entered in the Alaska port cities from any foreign port;
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, that the collectors of Juneau,
Ketchikan, and other Alaska municipalities and their duly authorized
port-representatives, may hereby collect the duties that are authorized by
this act, and pay the same to such persons as shall be authorized to receive
the duty on behalf of the state.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, that this act shall be in force for
twenty years, and from thence to the end of the next session of Congress
thereafter, subject to renewal by this Congress.

